Showing posts with label merchant. Show all posts
Showing posts with label merchant. Show all posts

Saturday, May 21, 2016

Article 2: Going Forward


As of this post, we have looked at some of the basic concepts in the formation of a contract under Article 2 including: the Statute of Frauds under Section 2-201; the importance of the distinction between a merchant and non merchant under Article 2; battle of the forms under Section 2-207; parol evidence under Section 2-202; recovery of attorneys’ fees as consequential damages under Section 2-607(5)(a); right to adequate assurance of performance under Section 2-609, and the failure of presupposed conditions under Section 2-615.
All of this is supplemented with all of the posts on Article 1 starting with the Purposes and Policies of the UCC as stated in Section 1-102, and the mandate to the courts to ‘liberally construe and apply’ the Code to further these policies.  The policies stated in Article 1 create a macro framework through which to process all of the Uniform Commercial Code.  These blend with the policies of a particular Article in the interpretation process. Supplemental rules of law under Section 1-103(b) is another section which allows facts to be uniquely applied to the supplemental area of law which applies to the case.  For those of you seeking to learn Article 2, it would be helpful to review the earlier posts on Article 1, followed by the Article 2 posts.  The more thorough your knowledge of Article 1, the better your foundation for everything that follows.
As we go forward with Article 2, several things should be stated.  First—and this is my opinion—sales transactions are the least formalized transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code.  By that I mean it is less likely that there will be a finalized, integrated document which has been formally executed than in any of the other Articles.  Sales transactions often involve a phone call, some correspondence, a shipping document and conduct which recognizes the existence of the contract.  As a result, terms supplied by the Code have greater significance.
Second, the Article 2 expectation is that in the event of a dispute the parties will work it out through negotiation.  This is a reflection of how these matters are handled in reality, and is reflected in the general structure and content of Article 2. Hence, comment 4 to Section 2-607, which deals with a buyer’s duty to notify a seller of a breach with respect to accepted goods states:
The notification which saves the buyer’s rights under this Article need only be such as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and thus opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation.
The ‘looseness’ of Article 2 in this regard is to be contrasted with the specificity of other Articles. Under Article 9, for example, you are more likely to find a definitive answer to a problem than you would under Article 2.  Secured lenders want certainty when enforcement of a secured obligation must take place.  Thus, the policy of certainty is expressed in the text of Article 9 and the policy of ‘keep the deal alive’ is expressed in the structure and text of Article 2.
            Third, the definitions of ‘contract’ and ‘agreement’ as defined under Article 1 have particular significance under Article 2.  This follows from the lack of formality referred to above.  Thus, course of performance, course of dealing and usage of trade need to be carefully examined in each instance to see how a particular concept might impact the contract.  As noted in an earlier post, a particular transaction may not involve a ‘course of performance’ or ‘course of dealing’ since parties may be dealing with one and other for the first time, and the contract may not call for ‘repeated occasions for performance’ with objectionable behavior.  However, virtually all sales transactions occur within some trade or industry which has its own rules and protocols.  Absent limiting contract provisions, these rules and protocols become part of the contract. Trade journals are a potential source of incredibly valuable information.
             Part 3 of Article 2 deals with General Obligations of the Parties:  Among other things, Part 3 supplies certain terms that the parties may not have included in their written agreement or writings.  For example, in certain circumstances parties to a contract can conclude a binding deal without have explicitly agreed on a price; the Code will supply a place of delivery if none has been stated; and where action is required by no timeline stated, the Code requires that action be taken within a ‘reasonable time’.  This ties into a Section 2-204(3) discussed in an earlier post:
A contract does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties intended a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
Section 2-301 states the obligations of the buyer and seller in very general terms:
The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the buyer is to accept       and pay in accordance with the contract.
 The comment to Section 2-301 explains this as follows:
In order to determine what is in ‘accordance with the contract’ under this Article usage of trade, course of dealing and performance, and the general background of circumstances must be given due consideration in conjunction with the lay meaning of the words used to define the scope of the conditions and duties.
 Section 2-301 thus forms the foundation for going forward in litigation; implicitly emphasizes the importance of drafting; and explicitly recognizes ‘usage of trade, course of dealing and performance’ as critical elements in determining the terms and interpretation of a contract.  These concepts, the drafting style of Article 2, and the overall purposes and policies of the Code should be incorporated in the process of analyzing Article 2 transactions.

Thursday, April 21, 2016

Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance: Be Clear!


Section 2-609 contemplates a situation where either party to a sales contract has ‘reasonable grounds for insecurity’ regarding the other party’s performance, and the insecure party wants some evidence that the other party is willing and able to perform. Subsection (1) to Section 2-609 states as follows:  
The cases are clear that the determination of whether or not a party’s stated grounds for insecurity are reasonable is a question of fact. In this regard, I want to emphasize a point made repeatedly throughout these posts, and particularly in connection with the discussion of Section 1-302(b) which allows parties to an agreement to set standards for what is or is not ‘reasonable’, provided the standards set are not ‘manifestly unreasonable’.  If standards for ‘reasonableness’ are in fact stated, the inquiry will be limited to: were the called for standards met, and if so, were the standards ‘manifestly unreasonable’? If the standards are not manifestly unreasonable, and proven, inquiry ends. Parties to a contract, can if they choose, create provisions for what ‘reasonably constitutes’ insecurity which would frame the inquiry as stated.
A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed return.

Although there are some cases which state that an oral demand for ‘adequate assurance of due performance’ is sufficient, the majority of cases follow the clear language of the statute which requires that the request for adequate assurances be in writing. Further, the cases are clear that the writing which purportedly seeks adequate assurances actually make it clear in the writing that such a demand is being made.  Mere objections as to performance do not meet the standard of a demand for proper performance which is required to gain the benefit of the provisions of the section. As discussed in the last post regarding Section 2-607(5)(a), the best way to insure that the requirements of a particular provision are complied with is to track the language of the statute.

In Alaska Pacific Trading Company v Eagon Forest Products 85 Wn App 354, 93 P 2d 41 (1997) one of the issues considered by the court was whether the purported demand for assurances was properly stated.  The case involved a sales contract by which ALPAC was to sell 15,000 cubic meters of logs to Eagon.  The lumber was to be shipped from Argentina to Korea.  Between the time of the execution of the contract in April of 1993 and time stated time for shipment, the market price for the lumber dropped significantly. Eagon became tentative about performing under the contract and ultimately, ALPAC came to the conclusion that Eagan was not going to accept the logs, and decided not to ship. In discussing whether or not a proper demand for adequate assurance of performance had been made by ALPAC, the court stated:          

Here, while Ahn [Eagon] had some idea that Kimura and ALPAC were concerned about the status of the contract, he did not understand that ALPAC would withhold performance as a result….If we were to hold that, in every case where a contract becomes less favorable for one party, general discussions between the parties can be considered requests for assurances, we would defeat the purpose of 2-609. That section requires a clear demand so that all parties are aware that, absent assurances, the demanding party will withhold performance. An ambiguous communication is not sufficient.   Eagon at 357

When merchants are involved, the determination of whether or not a particular performance was such as to properly give rise to insecurity will be determined by commercial standards:

          (2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any                 assurance offered shall be determined according to commercial standards.

This is consistent with Article 2 in general and the drafters’ consistent direction to focus on what is going on in the commercial world, not simply the legalese involved.  As stated in comment 2 to Section 2-202:

[This section definitely rejects] the premise that the language used has the meaning attributable to such language by rules of construction existing in law rather than the meaning which arises out of the commercial context in which it was used;

This policy applies throughout Article 2 and, through the expanded definition of good faith, arguably throughout the Code.
         Once a proper demand for adequate assurance of performance has been made, the failure to provide that assurance is a repudiation of the contract:
 After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation of the contract.  Section 2-609(4)
Section 2-609 provides parties with a remedial type course of action which is short of litigation, but clearly creates a situation where insecurities about performance are either effectively dealt with through adequate assurances of performance or repudiation occurs as a result of not providing those assurances.  Firms dealing in sales and leases of goods would be well advised to create a template for properly activating and utilizing Section 2-609.  This is in addition to drafting a contract provision which sets standards for ‘reasonable grounds for insecurity.'

Thursday, February 18, 2016

Section 2-607(5)(a): Attorneys’ Fees as Consequential Damages


As noted in previous posts, the designation of a party as a merchant activates a number of special provisions under Article 2.  Among the most important is the warranty of merchantability under Section 2-314.  Subsection (1) to Section 2-314 states as follows:
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in the contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.  Section 2-341(1)
What is or is not merchantable is set forth in Section 2-314(2):
            Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description;     and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
Sales of goods often involve several levels of distribution.  Initially, the sale of raw materials to be used in the manufacture of finished goods; sales from the wholesale to the retail level, and the sale to the retail customer. The warranty of  merchantability will be given at each stage provided the seller is a merchant.  Most of the time, the goods will meet the requisite standard of merchantability; sometimes they will not.  Very often this will occur in a situation involving a middleman who purchases goods for resale.  When the goods sold are not merchantable, and the middleman is sued for breach of warranty, specific rules kick in which the middleman should be aware of if he or she is to minimize exposure. 
Section 2-607(5)(a) contains rules of particular significance when goods are resold by a middleman to a third party.  That section states as follows:
Section 2-607(5)(a) states as follows:
Where the buyer is sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation for which his seller is answerable over
(a)  he may give his seller written notice of the litigation. If the notice states that the seller may come in and defend and that if the seller does not do so he will be bound in any action against him by his buyer by any determination of fact common to the two litigations, then unless the seller after seasonable receipt of the notice does come in and defend he is so bound.
This section enables the middleman who is being sued for the allegedly defective product to put his seller on notice of the litigation and provide him with the opportunity to defend against the litigation.  The failure of the original seller to do so will result in his being ‘bound in any action against him by his buyer by any determination of fact common to the two litigations.’
            As has been stated throughout these posts, it is highly recommended that the actual language of the statute be tracked in this type of situation.  ‘Coming close’ can result in litigation costs that could have been avoided.  In this regard however, and in connection with Section 2-607(5)(a), it must be noted that this section is permissive in nature, and that if a party does not strictly comply with Section 2-607(5)(a), she or he may still maintain a cause of action against her/his buyer for the breach of warranty.
This follows from the language of Section 2-607(5)(a) which states that the buyer ‘may give his seller written notice of the litigation.’  It is clearly permissive.  This question was thoroughly discussed by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Old Kent Bank v Kal Kustom Enterprises, which has impact in all states by reason of the uniformity provision of Section 1-103(1)(b).  See e.g. of In re Hispanic American Television Co., Inc., 113 B.R. 453 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990). 
The court in Old Kent discussed the permissive nature of Section 2-607(5)(a) as follows:
The language of M.C.L. § 440.2607(5)(a) is clear and unambiguous.   The statute's plain language reflects its discretionary nature.   Again, the statute states that where a buyer is sued for breach of warranty or other obligation for which his seller is liable, he “may give his seller written notice of the litigation.”
The court went on to state:
Further emphasizing the permissive nature of subsection 2607(5)(a) is the fact that a review of other subsections set forth in M.C.L. § 440.2607(5) indicates that the Legislature intentionally made some portions of the statute mandatory, and others permissive.   Subsections 2607(3)(a) and 2607(3)(b) contain the mandatory “must” in terms of notice.5  If the Legislature intended subsection 2607(5)(a) to be mandatory, it would have used similar mandatory language.
            I have been involved in cases where the original seller refuses to come into defend and in some situations completely ignores the notice sent.  This leaves the middleman in a very bad situation, for the original seller is the party best equipped to defend the product he sold.  As a result of this reality, at least one court has awarded attorney’s fees to the middleman who gave proper notice.  The starting point for this analysis is Section 2-714, which deals with buyer’s damages for accepted goods where seller has breached.  That section states as follows:
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3) of Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.
(3)In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next section may also be recovered.
As noted in Section 2-714(3), in a ‘proper case’ incidental and consequential damages may be recovered under Section 2-715:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.  
            In addressing the question of attorney’s fees, it must be noted that the attorney’s fees recoverable under Section 2-715(2)(a) are of a different nature than those claimed in a traditional contract litigation.  Attorney’s fees incurred in connection with a litigation in which a non breaching party is, in effect, forced to defend a claim from his buyer for defective goods sold by the original seller, are of a whole different nature.
            The precise issue was discussed by the United States District Court Acushnet Co. v. G.I. Joe’s, Inc., 2006 WL 2729555 (D. Or. Sept. 22, 2006). The case involved a breach of infringement warranty governed by Section 2-312(3) of the UCC.  Acushnet is the sole manufacturer of Titleist golf balls.  G.I. Joe’s purchased what it thought were Titleist balls from Cam Golf. They were in fact fakes.  Acushnet investigated further and learned that other fake Titleist balls were being sold by G.I. Joe’s elsewhere.
            Acushnet sued G.I. Joe’s, who in turn joined Cam Golf, Inc., the latter for breach of the warranty of infringement.  Acushnet and G.I. Joe’s settled with G.I. Joe’s paying $25,000 and incurring $19,300 in attorney’s fees. G.I. Joe sought recovery of both amounts in its action against Cam Golf.   The latter argued that attorneys’ fees were not recoverable, citing supposed authority for that proposition.  G.I. Joe responded:
G.I. Joe’s contends that Cam Golf has confused the issue of recovering attorney’s fees in prosecuting a lawsuit against the seller of goods with attorney’s fees incurred in defending a claim brought against the buyer by a third party. [at page 5]
 In addressing the matter, the court noted the permissive nature of Section 2-607(5)(a) and concluded that attorney’s fees were recoverable under Section 2-715(2)(a),  the Court quoted from Raymond v. Feldman 124 Ore. App 543, 546 (1993) as follows:
The general rule is that attorney’s fees are not recoverable in a breach of contract action unless authorized by statute or the agreement.  However  an exception to the general rule is when a party’s breach of contract involves the non breaching party in litigation with a third party  In such a case the non breaching party may be entitled to recover its litigation costs resulting from the separate action. [at page 6; Emphasis the Court’s]
These consequential damages are recoverable under the language of Section 2-715(2)(a), and the general policy of Section 1-305 which seeks to make non breaching parties whole, and has a special exception for awarding attorney’s fees when permitted under ‘other applicable rules of law’. The rule allowing attorney’s fees in defense of third party products is one of those exceptions. 
I suggest that parties who may be involved in situations in which Section 2-607(5)(a) create a document tracking the language of that section so that effective notice can be given in any situation in which it is required.

Thursday, February 11, 2016

Merchants and the Economic Loss Doctrine


This post will conclude the discussion of who is, or may be a merchant under Article 2. The impact of ‘merchant status’ has been discussed in general.  However, there is one point which has not been touched on, which should be.  That involves the impact of the good faith definition under Article 2 for those states that have not enacted the amended definition of good faith in Article 1. The amended definition, if you recall requires ‘honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing’,  per Section 1-201(b)(20). This applies to merchants and non merchants alike since the definitions in Article 1 apply to all substantive Articles of the Code per Section 1-102.
There are however, a significant number of states which have not adopted the amended definition of good faith*, but have instead, remained with the earlier definition of good faith which simply requires ‘honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned’.  Under Article 2 however, if a party is classified as a merchant, the good faith definition [Section 1-103(1)(b)] is almost identical to the amended definition under Article 1 and thus, requires the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade by the party designated as a merchant.  Thus, the standard of conduct is elevated in the commercial arena.  Conversely, if a party is not designated as a merchant and the state law governing has not adopted the amended the definition of ‘good faith’, the party in question simply needs to demonstrate honesty.  Moreover, there are areas outside the Code which are dramatically impacted by whether or not a party is classified as a merchant under Article 2.
The latter point is dramatically illustrated in the case of Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Chief Industries Inc., 106 F3d 1409 (8th Cir., 1997).  Among the program offerings at the University of Minnesota was an agricultural program which included the Southwest Research station, which was one of several such agricultural research stations operated by the University.   In 1985, the University decided to purchase a new grain dryer for the Southwest Station. After soliciting bids, the superintendent of the Research Station purchased a drying unit manufactured by a subsidiary of the defendant, Chief Industries.  In August of 1982, a fire damaged the structure to which the unit was attached.  The University brought a cause of action alleging that the electric solenoid valve, designed to stop the flow of fuel to the unit at a certain temperature, failed and was the cause of the fire.  In addition to damages for the allegedly defective grain dryer, the University sought damages to the connected structure.
The controlling statute in the case was Minnesota Section 604.10, which deals with the economic loss doctrine in Minnesota. ** That section states as follows:
Minn. Stat. § 604.10.  Economic loss arising from the sale of goods.
(a)  Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods that is due to damage to tangible property other than the goods sold may be recovered in tort as well as in contract, but economic loss that arises from a sale of goods between parties who are each merchants in goods of the kind is not recoverable in tort; (b) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods, between merchants, that is not due to damage to tangible property other than the goods sold may not be recovered in tort; (c) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this section does not include economic loss due to damage to the goods themselves; (d) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this section does not include economic loss incurred by a manufacturer of goods arising from damage to the manufactured goods and caused by a component of the goods; and (e) This section shall not be interpreted to bar tort causes of action based upon fraud or fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation or limit remedies for those actions. [Emphasis added].
Hence, if the University of Minnesota was held to be a merchant, it would be barred from recovery for damage to the additional structure by the economic loss doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment against the University concluding that the University was a ‘merchant.'
The Court of Appeals phrased the matter on appeal as follows:
This brings us to this appeal's sole question:  is the University a “merchant in goods of the kind?"   That is, is the University a merchant with respect to grain drying heaters such as the one that allegedly caused the fire at the Southwest station?   If, as the district court concluded, the University is a merchant with respect to grain dryers, then it may not recover in tort under either the statute or [case law].  Regents of the University of Minnesota @ 1411
            In addressing the issue, the court first noted the definition of ‘merchant’ under Section 2-104(1), noting in its analysis two ways in which a party can become a merchant: ***
1.    By dealing in the goods involved;
2.    By way of specialized knowledge of the goods.
After quickly dismissing avenue number one—i.e.—that the University ‘dealt in goods of the kind’ the court turned its attention to attaining merchant status by way of specialized knowledge of the goods.  In addressing that question, and affirming the decision of the district court, the court of appeals stated:
In the present case, the University's knowledge and experience with respect to grain dryers constituted “knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction.”  Minn.Stat. § 336.2-104(1).
The University had purchased a number of such units over the prior thirty years, and had the advantage of a centralized purchasing department that solicited bids for the purchase.   Before purchasing the unit, the Southwest station's superintendent (who had been responsible for other such purchases) consulted a prominent expert in grain drying, who provided advice on such specifications for the unit as fan size and BTU.
            Creating ‘merchant’ status on the basis of ‘specialized knowledge’ opens the door to finding merchant status in situations outside of the normal professional in business.  While this may not be significant in all cases, it will be in some.  This is yet another example where leverage and vulnerability can be created where the other party never saw it coming.  This creates insecurity and facilitates a good settlement for your client.

*Among those states are: Illinois, Missouri and New York
**If you interested in an excellent article on the Economic Loss Doctrine, please check the following:


***The court did not mention the third way a party can become a merchant, which is through the ‘employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill’.

Thursday, February 4, 2016

Banks, Merchants & Article 2


As discussed in the previous post, the characterization of a party as a merchant or non merchant has great significance under Article 2.  This brings us to a point where the cases add a unique flavor to an otherwise very clear definition.  These cases also illustrate the positive results that creativity can bring to the table.  Very early in these posts, the importance of utilizing the mandates of Section 1-103 in presenting creative arguments was emphasized. By way of review, and in the context of the case to be discussed, Section 1-103 directs the court to ‘liberally construe and apply the code’ and to do so in a manner which promotes the underlying purposes and policies of the Code:
(a) The Uniform Commercial Code must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies, which are: (1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (2) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and (3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
As you view these creative applications of the definition of ‘merchant’, it is useful to see how many of these purposes and policies support the broad interpretation adopted by the courts. 
            The first case for consideration is National Microsales v. Chase Manhattan Bank  761 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)   The facts are briefly as follows:
National Microsales Corporation was engaged in the business of buying and selling computer output microfilming equipment. Chase Manhattan entered into negotiations with National Microsales Corporation to sell some of its used Computer Output Microfilming equipment to NMC for resale. When Chase subsequently sold the equipment to a third party, NMC filed suit alleging breach of contract.
Chase moved for summary judgment dismissing NMC's complaint on the basis of the Statute of Frauds, alleging that the purported contract in question was over $500 and there was no writing as required by Section 2-201(1).
National Microsales Corporation also moved for summary judgment claiming the contract in question was covered by the ‘merchant exception’ contained in Section 2-201(2).  As you may recall, that section applies only to transactions ‘between merchants’; hence, for that section to apply, the court would have to conclude that the bank was a ‘merchant’ under Article 2.

In presenting its case, NMC noted that Chase sold $6.5 million worth of used COM equipment from 1987-1989, and further that there were established policies and procedures of Chase which had been adopted for the purchasing new equipment as well as other ‘fixed surplus assets’.
Chase's response was that it never purchased goods for resale and that Chase has no specialized knowledge concerning the goods which it buys for its own use. There was also testimony that Chase had no familiarity with the market for the equipment which it purchased, and that when it disposed of surplus goods, it generally sold them to resellers, rather than end users, and usually sold the equipment for less than fair market value.
The court found that Chase was in fact a ‘merchant for purposes of the UCC’.  As support, the court quoted the definition of ‘merchant in Section 2-104 and Official Comment 2 to Section 2-104 which states:
The special provisions as to merchants appear only in this Article and they are of three kinds. Sections 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207 and 2-209 dealing with the statute of frauds, firm offers, confirmatory memoranda, and modification rest on normal business practices which are or ought to be typical of and familiar to any person in business. For purposes of these sections almost every person in business would, therefore, be deemed to be a "merchant" under the language "who . . . by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices . . . involved in the transaction . . ." since the practices involved in the transaction are non-specialized business practices such as answering mail.
In applying the definition of merchant and comment 2 above, the court stated: 
This comment implies that Chase's familiarity with the goods it purchases and sells is sufficient to establish that it is a merchant for the purposes of § 2-201… For Statute of Frauds purposes, the scope and extent of Chase's activities qualify it for merchant status under the UCC.  National Microsales at 307
            The extent of the Court’s holding on the merchant matter is unclear.  On the one hand, the court seems to attempt to limit is holding on the merchant question to the Statute of Frauds provision.  If that were the case however, the Court could have easily so stated without any discussion of ‘Chase’s familiarity with the goods it purchases and sells’.  The limited reading would be found in the fact that responding to mail is something everyone in business should do as clearly stated in the comment.  In mentioning the goods and familiarity of practices with those goods, the Court can easily be interpreted to be saying more.
            There are huge implications from holding that the bank is a ‘merchant with respect to goods of the kind’ for at this point, the warranty of merchantability kicks in, as well as a host of other merchant provisions, some of which have been stated in the last post.  There is a large potential exposure to the bank if it is classified as a ‘merchant under Article 2’, which can create great leverage in litigation.

Thursday, January 28, 2016

Merchants or Non Merchants—That is the Question


The importance of thoroughly understanding the definitions used throughout the   Uniform Commercial Code has been repeatedly emphasized throughout the posts on the UCC Made Easy blog.  As stated, Article 1 definitions apply throughout the Code; in addition, each Article has definitions unique to its subject content.  One of the most important definitions in Article 2 is the definition of ‘merchant’ contained in Section 2-104(1):
 "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
            The definition contains several routes to achieving merchant status:
1.    A person dealing in ‘goods of the kind’’;
2.    A person who holds himself out as having knowledge or skills peculiar to the goods involved;
3.    A person to whom such knowledge can be attributed by employment of a third party who, by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
            Merchant or non merchant status is very important under Article 2 for a number of reasons.  By way of illustration: the reply doctrine of Section 2-201 requires that the transaction occur ‘between merchants’ in order for that doctrine to apply, Section 2-205 deals with firm offers ‘by a merchant,’ Section 2-207(2) which deals with incorporating certain terms into the contract via a writing in confirmation of a contract only applies in a transaction ‘between merchants,’ the warranty of merchantability only applies when a party is a ‘merchant with respect to goods of the kind per Section 2-314(1), entrustment of goods under Section 2-403(2) does not occur unless the entrustment is to a ‘merchant who deals in goods of the kind’.
            In most cases it will be relatively clear if a person or entity should be classified as a merchant. In a significant number of cases however, it is not so clear.  For example, case law is generally split on whether or not a farmer is a merchant. A large number of the cases discussing this question involved the reply doctrine of Section 2-201(2) with a very practical impact: if the farmer in question was a merchant, a written confirmation of the contract by the buyer which was not answered within ten days would result in an exception to the general statute of frauds rule.  Conversely, if the farmer was not held to be a merchant, the reply doctrine would not apply.        
Moreover, a person or entity may be a merchant for some purposes, but not for others.  In addition, certain entities may be characterized as merchants where that designation may be somewhat surprising.
 An example of the foregoing can be is found in banking institutions or universities.   If someone were to pose the question of whether or not a bank or a university is a merchant for purposes of Article 2, instinctively, most of us would say ‘no’.  However, there is case law to the contrary which itself is supported by the comments to Section 2-104:
The special provisions as to merchants appear only in this Article and they are of three kinds.  Section 2-201(2), 2-207 and 2-209 dealing with the statute of frauds, firm offers, confirmatory memoranda and modification rest on normal business practices which are or ought to be familiar to any person in business. For purposes of these sections almost every person in business would therefore, be deemed to be a “merchant” under the language “who…by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to practices…involved in the transaction…” since the practices involved in the transaction are non specialized business practices such as answering mail…. But even these sections only apply to a merchant in his mercantile capacity; a lawyer or bank president buying fishing tackle for his own use is not a merchant.
It is clear from the text of the Code and the comments noted above that one might be a merchant for certain purposes under the Code, but not for other purposes.
            The next post will discuss cases which address the question of whether or not a bank or university is a merchant for Article 2 purposes when it engages in the sale or purchase of certain products.  As you will see, the impact of the classification as a merchant or non merchant in these situations can be very powerful.