Thursday, November 12, 2015

Imposters, Fictitious Payees & Effective Indorsements


The basic rule regarding liability on an instrument is expressed in Section 3-401: if a person does not sign the instrument, he or she is not liable on the instrument.  In addition to this basic rule, Section 3-401(a) also provides the first exception to the general rule by providing that a party can be liable on an instrument by an agent’s signature.  It was noted in our discussion of Section 3-402 that the principal in such a situation can be held liable on an instrument even if not specifically named by the agent, assuming that the authority did in fact exist.  Another exception to the general rule was discussed in connection with Section 3-406.  In that situation, a person whose negligence ‘substantially contributed’ to the forgery will be precluded from asserting the forgery against a ‘person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or for collection’.  Hence, liability can be established without the signature having been made.
            This post will discuss a different scenario pertaining to signatures which is activated by the imposter and fictitious payee rules of Section 3-404.  Section 3-404(a) states as follows:
If an impostor, by use of the mails or otherwise, induces the issuer of an instrument to issue the instrument to the impostor, or to a person acting in concert with the impostor, by impersonating the payee of the instrument or a person authorized to act for the payee, an indorsement of the instrument by any person in the name of the payee is effective as the indorsement of the payee in favor of a person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or for collection.
Section 3-406(a) envisions two situations: 
                     Situation # 1:
1.    An imposter;
2.    An issuer who has been ‘induced by the imposter’—by the mails or otherwise-- to issue the instrument to the imposter;
      Situation # 2:
1.    An imposter induces the issuer to issue the instrument to:
·      A person acting in concert with the imposter who impersonates the payee of the instrument; or
·      A person acting in concert with the imposter who impersonates a person authorized to act for the payee.
Examples of the application are relatively simple and straightforward.  In situation # 1, the imposter is simply pretending to be someone he or she is not. The issuer has bought into the scheme and issues an instrument to the imposter.  In situation #2, the accomplice of the imposter is pretending to be the intended payee or someone authorized to act for the payee.
Section 3-406(a) goes on to state that if an instrument so issued is subsequently indorsed ‘by any person’ in the name of the payee to a person ‘who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or collection’, such indorsement is ‘effective as that of the payee’.  Assume for example that Imposter induced Issuer to deliver a check for $25,000.00 to the Imposter who claimed to be Fred Jones.  The Imposter’s signature as ‘Fred Jones’ is effective as that of Fred Jones as regards a person who in good faith paid the instrument or took it for value or for collection.  As such, the drawer is liable on his or her drawer’s contract, at least initially. [Exception to be discussed below.]
  The signature in the foregoing example is ‘effective’ even though Fred Jones does not exist. Similarly, if Imposter induced Issuer to deliver a $25,000.00 check payable to Fred Jones to someone pretending to be Fred Jones, or someone authorized to act for Fred Jones, a subsequent indorsement in the name of Fred Jones is effective as that of Fred Jones  to a person who in good faith paid the instrument or took it for value or collection.
Note that the language states that the indorsement ‘by any person in the name of the payee is effective as the indorsement of the payee in favor of someone who pays in good faith or has taken the instrument for value or collection’.  Therefore, if the Imposter or his colleague loses the check and someone else picks it up and indorses ‘Fred Jones’ that too will be considered an effective indorsement to someone who in good faith paid the instrument or took it for value or collection.
The policy of section 3-404(a) is simple: it was the drawer of the check that got duped into issuing the check.  Therefore, the drawer will not be relieved of liability on the check to a person who in good faith paid the instrument or took it for value or consideration.  This is analogous to the rule discussed in the last post, and consistent with the general policy of the Uniform Commercial Code in placing responsibility on parties whose culpable conduct set the series of transactions in motion.
Section 3-404(b) applies to cases dealing with not just fictitious payees, but also instruments issued to existing payees that the issuer does not intend to have any interest in the instrument.  That section also states certain rules with regard to such an instrument prior to any special indorsement on the instrument:
(b) If (i) a person whose intent determines to whom an instrument is payable (Section 3-110(a) or (b)) does not intend the person identified as payee to have any interest in the instrument, or (ii) the person identified as payee of an instrument is a fictitious person, the following rules apply until the instrument is negotiated by special indorsement:
(1) Any person in possession of the instrument is its holder.
(2) An indorsement by any person in the name of the payee stated in the instrument is effective as the indorsement of the payee in favor of a person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or for collection.

It is interesting to note that in such a situation, an indorsement in the name of the payee ‘substantially similar’ to that of the payee will be effective and further, if such an instrument is taken to a depository bank and deposited in an account in a name ‘substantially similar’ to the payee, it will be treated as an effective indorsement.  The latter is true even if the instrument has not been indorsed:
(c) Under subsection (a) or (b), an indorsement is made in the name of a payee if (i) it is made in a name substantially similar to that of the payee or (ii) the instrument, whether or not indorsed, is deposited in a depositary bank to an account in a name substantially similar to that of the payee.
            As stated in Section 3-404(a), the effectiveness of the Impostor’s indorsement is in favor of a ‘person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or collection.’  As discussed in a previous post, good faith under Article 3 means ‘honesty in fact and the observance of  reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing’ either via Section 3-103(a)(6) for those states that have not enacted the amended definition of good faith or via 1-201(b)(20) for those that have. The exception is New York who has neither enacted the amended definition of good faith or the amendments to Article 3.
            As was also discussed, the use of the words ‘reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing’ are intended to focus on the fairness of conduct, not the commercial reasonableness of conduct.  The absence of commercial reasonableness in conduct in the Imposter/Fictitious Payee situation has been addressed in Section 3-404(d):
(d) With respect to an instrument to which subsection (a) or (b) applies, if a person paying the instrument or taking it for value or for collection fails to exercise ordinary care in paying or taking the instrument and that failure substantially contributes to loss resulting from payment of the instrument, the person bearing the loss may recover from the person failing to exercise ordinary care to the extent the failure to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss.
Therefore, the broad statement dealing with the effectiveness of the indorsement under Section 3-404(a) is limited not only by the good faith requirement, but also by a requirement to exercise ordinary care in paying the instrument or taking it for value or collection.  Ordinary care was discussed in detail in the previous post, but it clearly requires the ‘observance of reasonable commercial standards’ in addition to the commercial fairness requirement of good faith.

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